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The containment response during the first 24 hours of a low-pressure severe accident
scenario in a nuclear power plant with a two-loop Westinghouse-type pressurized
water reactor was simulated with the CONTAIN 2.0 computer code. The accident
considered in this study is a large-break loss-of-coolant accident, which is not suc-
cessfully mitigated by the action of safety systems. The analysis includes pressure and
temperature responses, as well as investigation into the influence of spray on the
retention of fission products and the prevention of hydrogen combustion in the
containment.
Copyright © 2016, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In the event of a large-break loss-of-coolant accident (LB
LOCA) in a pressurized water reactor (PWR), coolant mass and
energy are first released from the reactor coolant system to
the containment through the break. This type of accident
occurs in a high-pressure cold-leg pipe in its worst condition,
which is a guillotine type of break. In such accidents, the
primary system envelope is breached [1].
If the accident is not successfully mitigated by the action
of safety systems, core meltdown, relocation and release of(M. Rahgoshay).
sevier Korea LLC on beha
mons.org/licenses/by-ncradioactive material to the containment through the break,
followed by reactor vessel failure and debris ejection will
eventually occur. To prevent early containment over-
pressurization due to heat load in an accident scenario,
spray systems and fan coolers are provided in the design of
nuclear power plants. They also have the function of
enhancing the early depletion of radionuclides from the
atmosphere.
The applicability of CONTAIN for the determination of
radiological source terms of a PWR under conservative release
conditions is demonstrated [2].lf of Korean Nuclear Society. This is an open access article under
-nd/4.0/).
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such a cold-leg LB LOCA in Beznau nuclear power plant
with a two-loop Westinghouse PWR was simulated with the
CONTAIN 2.0 computer code [3], which was developed by
Sandia National Laboratories under U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission sponsorship. Initial and boundary conditions,
which result from processes not modeled by CONTAIN,
were obtained from simulation with the RELAP5/SCDAP
code [4].
Coreeconcrete interaction, including the attack of the
basemat concrete by molten core material, was modeled with
the CORCON code, which is included in CONTAIN.
The analysis is focused on the thermalehydraulic aspect of
the containment response. Pressure and temperature re-
sponses, as well as the influence of spray on the depletion of
fission products from the atmosphere and hydrogen distri-
bution in the containment, are considered.
In support of the analysis for Beznau nuclear power
plant (Switzerland), a safety analysis report, and detailed
RELAP5/SCDAP and CONTAIN models of the plant are
developed [5].
The Beznau PWR is a Westinghouse-designed nuclear
power station with a rated thermal power of 1,130 MW. There
are two primary coolant loops. Each loop contains a U-tube
steam generator, a reactor coolant pump, and associated
piping. A single pressurizer is attached to the hot-leg piping in
one of the two loops. Two accumulators are attached to each
cold leg. A large, dry, subatmospheric containment building
surrounds the reactor systems. Specifications of the contain-
ment are shown in Table 1. Beznau has two separate spray
systems in the containment. The two spray systems operate
independently, with a capacity of 45 kg/s [5], via spray nozzles
located in the upper compartment of the containment. The
actuation time of the spray system is determined by an
overpressure signal (the set value is 2.0 bara). Operation of the
spray system is helpful in decreasing the average pressure by
condensing steam. Additionally, the cold droplets from spray
nozzles, as heat sinks, also lower the average temperature in
the containment.2. Materials and methods
2.1. CONTAIN code description
The CONTAIN 2.0 computer code is an integrated analysis tool
used for predicting the physical conditions, chemical com-
positions, and distributions of radiological materials inside aTable 1 e Specification of Beznau containment.
Parameter Value
Free volume (m3) 47,500.0
Containment elevation (m) 55.0
Containment inner radius (m) 19.0
Concrete wall thickness (m) 1.1
Steel liner thickness (m) 0.006
Cavity concrete floor thickness (m) 4.0containment building following the release of material from
the primary system in a light water reactor accident. It can
also predict the amount of source term released to the envi-
ronment [3].
The fission product behavior modeled in CONTAIN in-
cludes radionuclide decay, decay heating, atmosphere trans-
port processes, transport in liquid pathways, iodine
scrubbing, release of fission products from hosts, and release
of fission products during coreeconcrete interactions.
CONTAIN allows the analyst to subdivide the containment
into any number of nodes or cells, each of which consists of a
well-mixed repository of gases (the atmosphere) as well a
number of solid heat transfer structures that exchange heat
with the atmosphere through an appropriate array of heat
transfer correlations [3].
The CONTAIN code includes developmental models for
melt ejection from the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and
dispersal from the cavity.2.2. CONTAIN input modeldcontainment
compartments
The model of the containment is presented by 15 cells in
Fig. 1. The containment dome is defined as Cell 12. Cell 15
represents the RPV, which is inactive in the present calcula-
tions and is treated as a dummy cell. Cells 3 and 10 are the
crane wall annulus. The cavity and instrument tunnel vol-
umes are represented by Cell 2, while the containment sump
is modeled as Cell 1. Reactor pool is modeled by Cell 11. The
steam generator rooms on the left and right sides are rep-
resented by Cells 4 and 8. The reactor coolant pump rooms on
the left and right sides are represented by Cells 5 and 7. The
free volumes below the steam generators are modeled as
Cells 6 and 9. Cells 13 and 14 model gap volume and envi-
ronment, respectively.
Fourteen flow paths and 22 engineering vents aremodeled.
Connections between compartments are shown schemati-
cally in Fig. 1 (each connection may represent several flow
paths or engineering vents). Flows between compartments are
modeled by applying the hybrid flow solver [3].Fig. 1 e Containment compartments and flow paths.
Fig. 2 e Containment pressure.
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modeled by steel or concrete rectangular heat structures, as
appropriate. These heat structures, particularly the masses
of concrete that form the containment walls, act as passive
heat sinks during accident conditions. The containment
shell is modeled by heat structures with adiabatic outer
surfaces. Heat transfer to the environment and the annulus
area between the double containment shells are not
modeled. Heat is ultimately removed from the containment
through the containment spray system and through the
transfer of heat from the containment sump liquid in the
heat exchangers.
Two spray systems were modeled. Sprays were initiated
when the containment pressure reached approximately 2.0
bara. The CONTAIN code does not model phenomena that
take place in the reactor coolant system.
To obtain time-dependent sources of coolant, gases, fission
products, and molten core material, which could be included
in the CONTAIN input, an LB LOCA with no safety injection
actuated is simulated with the severe accident code RELAP5/
SCDAP [4].
The RELAP5/SCDAP codes is a severe accident analysis
code capable of modeling all important severe accident
phenomena (reactor coolant system response, core material
chemical reactions, oxidation, ballooning and rupture of the
fuel rod cladding, core heat-up, degradation and relocation
to the lower plenum, etc.). The code is a combination of the
RELAP5 code for thermal hydraulics calculation, the SCDAP
code for severe accident-related phenomena, and the
COUPLE code for a finite element treatment of the RPV lower
head. The RELAP5/SCDAP can only model the in-vessel
phase of the severe accident. RELAP5/SCDAP is character-
ized by its detailed, mechanistic models of severe accident
phenomena; however, the calculations can be rather time
consuming [4].
The sequence of events during the development of the
accident in the primary system is summarized in Table 2.
The following sources were obtained:
 Liquid and vapor coolant
 Gases: N2, O2, H2
 Fission products: Xe, Te, Cs, I
 Molten core material: UO2, ZrO2, Zr, Fe, Cr, NiTable 2 e Sequence of events during LB LOCA.
Event Time
(sec)
Large break in the cold leg 0
Reactor scram 2
Start of accumulator feed 5
End of accumulator feed 65
Failure of cladding (cladding exceeds the temperature of
1,173 K)
620
Molten corium starts to form the molten pool 2,230
Dry core (no water in the active core) 2,790
Start of melt material slump in the lower head of the
vessel
3,670
Pressure vessel failure 5,100
LB LOCA, large-break loss-of-coolant accident.The majority of the core material inventory is released to
the cavity at low pressure after vessel creep rupture at
approximately 5,100 seconds. The reactor coolant system
pressure at the time of vessel breach is an important param-
eter controlling direct containment heating. At very low
reactor coolant system pressures, as seen in LOCA, the pre-
requisites of efficient dispersal and fragmentation are not
present for efficient direct containment heating interactions.
Consequently, there are no heat transfer and chemical re-
actions that may lead to containment overpressurization [6].3. Results and discussion
Two different simulationswere performed: (i) with no spray in
the containment; and (ii) with spray in the containment.
The initial time (t ¼ 100 seconds) was defined by the
occurrence of the large break. The initial pressure in the
containment was assumed to be 0.98 bara. The initial tem-
perature of the containment atmosphere and heat structures
was 322 K.
Hot hydrogen, produced by metal steam reactions in the
reactor cavity or subcompartment, vents into the upper dome
of the containment, where it can burn as a diffusion flame.Fig. 3 e Containment temperature.
Fig. 5 eMass of the gases released in the cavity due to CCI.
CCI, coreeconcrete interaction.
Fig. 6 e Containment sump water temperature.
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source is not taken into account and the diffusion flame
model, in the presence of conditions for low autoignition
criteria, simply burns the combustible gas flowing into a cell
through a flow path utilizing the oxygen in the cell.
Fission product retention in the primary system and on
containment structures is more effective if these elements
can be maintained at a lower temperature. For this purpose,
containment sprays using cool water with the use of residual
heat removal heat exchangers can be utilized. Water addition
via containment sprays can be used to scrub fission products
from the containment atmosphere and thus reduce fission
product releases.
The containment sump is located inside the containment
and provides an additional source of water for long-term
containment cooling by spray.
Water from the containment sump passes through a heat
exchanger and, after cooling, is used as spray water in the
containment.
In case of hydrogen release inside the containment, sprays
homogenize the hydrogen distribution and may lead to “de-
inerting” of the mixture through condensation of steam on
water droplets. In case of ignition, the water spray can affect
flame propagation. Two antagonizing effects can be expected:
(i) flame acceleration due to the turbulence induced by spray
actuation; and (ii) flame quenching due to the cooling effect of
water spray [7].
In the absence of spray, pressure in themain compartment
of the containment (Cell 12) first increases sharply due to the
coolant released from the primary system, and then decreases
as the coolant condenses on heat structures or aerosols. At
5,100 seconds, with failure of RPV molten material ejected to
cavity, an increase in pressure occurs.
Especially with the use of spray systems, hydrogen com-
bustion is possible, as steam inertization is lost and combus-
tible conditions are more probable. Without operation of the
spray system, steam acts as an inerting gas, unless inertiza-
tion gets lost and accumulated hydrogen burns. As seen in
Fig. 2, at 54,400 seconds after the start of an accident, a
stronger deflagration of hydrogen leads to an increase of
pressure to about 4.5 bara. This value is more than the design
pressure of the containment (4.0 bara) [8] but is less than the
failure pressure (8.0 bara) [8], and containment integrity is
maintained. At the end of the calculation, the pressureFig.4 e Hydrogen generation during the in-vessel phase.reaches approximately 3.93 bara, which is close to the design
pressure of the containment.
Spray acts when containment pressure reaches 2.0 bara
(half of design pressure) at about 5 seconds after the initiation
of accident. With the operation of the spray, pressure in the
containment is less than the previous case (without the
spray), and slow burning of hydrogen is predicated. The
pressure reaches about 1.5 bara after 24 hours, which is lessFig. 7 e Steam mass in the cells of the containment.
Fig. 9 e Mass of hydrogen burned in the containment cells
without spray in operation.
Fig. 10 e Hydrogen mass in the cells of the containment.
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capacity on the containment response is assessed as a
sensitivity study, which is shown in Figs. 2 and 3.
Fig. 3 depicts the atmospheric temperature in Cell 12. With
the operation of the spray system and absorption of heat from
the containment atmosphere, the temperature decreases;
however, in the case without spray, the containment tem-
perature is higher because there is no heat removal from the
containment.
The values of hydrogen mass calculated by RELAP5/SCDAP
due to oxidation of clad during the in-vessel phase are shown
in Fig. 4. After RPV failure and ejection of molten materials
into the cavity, hydrogen generation from ablation of concrete
is calculated by CONTAIN code, using CORCON model. The
long-term pressurization is mostly due to the generation of
noncondensable gases (H2, CO, and CO2) caused by molten
coreeconcrete interaction (Fig. 5).
The temperature of the containment sump water should
be maintained below the saturation temperature during long-
term cooling of the containment. The temperature of the
sump calculated during the analysis is shown in Fig. 6.
There are various potential challenges to containment
integrity during a severe accident in a light water reactor.
Generation of hydrogen and its combustion pose significant
risk for severe accidents. For the prevention of hydrogen
combustion, the concentration of hydrogen should be kept
low, especially in the dome of the containment wheremost of
the hydrogen accumulates.
The mechanisms of condensation and entrainment by
operation of spray have opposite consequences for hydrogen
combustion. On the one hand, atmosphere mixing due to
entrainment caused by falling droplets (that is, momentum
transfer from the droplets to the atmosphere) causes a more
uniform hydrogen concentration in the containment. On the
other hand, steam condensation on droplets causes a
decrease of steam concentration in the atmosphere and a
corresponding increase in hydrogen concentration.
After 24 hours, steam concentration in the cells of the
containment decreases with the operation of spray, as shown
in Fig. 7. In the case of spray operation with respect to low
criteria for autoignition of hydrogen dominant slow burning
occurs in Cell 6 (source compartment) from the beginning of
the analysis, and burning in the other cells are negligible.Fig. 8 e Mass of hydrogen burned in the containment cells
with one and two sprays in operation.Hydrogen burning under different spray conditions in cells
of the containment is shown in Fig. 8. In the case without
spray, because of the high steam concentration only in Cell 6
(source compartment), burning of hydrogen occurs with less
value than with spray operation from the beginning of the
analysis, as shown in Fig. 9. In the other cells, hydrogen
burning starts at 54,400 seconds, when accumulated hydrogen
reaches combustible threshold value. Therefore, imple-
mentation of hydrogen counter measures is needed in
different locations of the containment.Table 3 e Release of fission product mass into the
containment.
Elements in
group
Initial inventory
(kg)
Mass released into the
containment (kg)
In-vessel
phase
Ex-vessel
phase
Xe, Kr 103.1 43.41 59.6
Cs, Rb 53.6 24.55 29.08
I 3.74 1.71 2.02
Te 8.61 3.94 4.65
Fig. 12 e Fission product mass in the atmosphere of the
containment with operation of sprays.
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actuation of spray and large-scale burning of hydrogen, the
remaining hydrogen mass in the main compartment of the
containment reduces and so the possibility of hydrogen
deflagration decreases.
In a severe accident, evaluation of the source term is
required to assess the radiological hazards to the public. As a
result of an accident, these fission products can escape to the
environment following containment venting, to prevent
containment failure.
In this analysis, four fission products that are most
important radiologically, Xe, Te, Cs, and I, are considered. The
initial inventory of the fission products and their released
mass into the containment, during the in- and ex-vessel
phases of severe accident progression, are shown in Table 3.
Typically in the ex-vessel phase, most fission products remain
in the melt that is released into the cavity, while some fission
products are released through coreeconcrete interaction.
In thiswork, themass of released fission products in the in-
vessel phase is calculated by RELAP5/SCDAP, and for simpli-
fication, all remaining fission products are immediately
released from the fuel, at the time of RPV failure, into the
containment as vapor becomes airborne. Steam is considered
as an aerosol component that can be a host of airborne fission
products.
Mitigation of noble gas release into the environment is
extremely difficult due to the low reactivity of these gases.
Noble gases have an important contribution to the whole-
body dose as well as the gamma dose [9].
Most of the isotopes of iodine and cesium have radiological
effects and hazardous effects on health. Mitigation of radio-
iodine is required in the case of severe accidents. Mitigation of
radioiodine is also important for reactor licensing.
The containment spray model allows for the removal of
aerosols, aerosolized fission products, elemental iodine, and
less reactive organic iodine compounds from the containment
atmosphere. With the operation of the containment spray,
aerosols and fission products are removed from the atmo-
sphere and transferred to the pool of the containment sump.
When elemental iodine is transferred to the containment
sump, control of radiological effects is easier, while iodine andFig. 11 e Fission product mass in sump water of the
containment with operation of sprays.cesium accumulated in the dome of the containment can be
released into the environment by venting the containment.
Masses of the fission products solved in the sump water of
the containment by operating the spray system are shown in
Fig. 11. Masses of the fission products transported back into
the containment atmosphere with the contaminated spray
water are shown in Fig. 12.
As the release of the fission products during in-vessel
phases ends, the remaining fission products with RPV failure
are released into the containment, so there is an increase in
themass of fission products. After 24 hours, the distribution of
fission products in different cells of the containment when
spray is not operated is shown in Fig. 13. The results show
significant quantities of Te, Cs and I, which are airborne
fission products, as vapor deposited in the steam as aerosol,
and which accumulated in the upper compartment of the
containment, in a similar way to Xe and Kr gases.
These fission products can escape into the environment
when containment venting occurs for prevention of contain-
ment failure, which is not acceptable from the safety point of
view. When the spray system is operated, as shown in Fig. 14,
all fission products including I, Cs, and Te, except noble gases
are washed and scrubbed away in the pool of the containment
sump.Fig. 13 e Fission product distribution in the containment
without spray in operation.
Fig. 14 e Fission product distribution in the containment
with one spray and two sprays in operation.
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Containment phenomena during an LB LOCA with low-
pressure vessel failure in a two-loop Westinghouse PWR
were simulated with the CONTAIN code. The following con-
clusions can be drawn:
 After an accident, the short-term containment pressuri-
zation is due to coolant release, whereas the long-term
pressurization is determined mostly by gas generation
caused by molten coreeconcrete interaction.
 Containment spray system operation leads to a decrease in
pressure in the long term and to hydrogen burning in the
containment.
 Most of the hydrogen generated by molten core concrete
interaction is entrained into the containment's main
compartment (dome) via natural circulation.
 With the operation of the spray system in the containment,
aerosols and fission products are removed from the at-
mosphere and transferred to the pool of the containment
sump.
 With the use of spray systems, hydrogen combustions
occur as steam inertization is lost.
 Without the operation of the spray system, steam acts as
an inerting gas, and accumulated hydrogen burns when
inertization is lost.
 For the case without spray, hydrogen burning does not
occur from the beginning of the analysis in all the cells, andso implementation of hydrogen countermeasures is
required in different locations of the containment.Conflicts of interest
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